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doctrine was inapplicable to all escaped livestock cases.
Rather, the Supreme Court stated that whether the
doctrine should be invoked should properly depend upon
whether the requirements of the doctrine were met— (1)
whether “the occurrence was one which would not, in
the ordinary course of things, happen in the absence of
negligence,” (2) whether the instrumentality was under
the exclusive control and management of the defendant
and (3) whether there was an explanation by the
defendant of how the animals came to be on the
highway.  The Nebraska Supreme Court stated that the
first two conditions were met and the third was a
question of fact for the jury and the jury did not believe
the defendant’s explanation.  Therefore, the doctrine was
properly invoked.
•  In the latest case, also in Nebraska,21 the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur was invoked with the jury returning a
verdict for the plaintiff in excess of $1 million.  The case
involved a collision of a car with a steer that had
apparently escaped from a pasture and wondered onto a
state highway.
Conclusion
Aside from the fact that leadership in the application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has come from
Nebraska, an important livestock-producing state, the
broader issue is the range of consequences expected to
flow from the Nebraska decision if followed in other
jurisdictions.  Certainly it will affect— (1) the level of
insurance carried by livestock farmers and ranchers; (2)
the cost of such coverage, in all likelihood; (3) the
attention given to fences and gates, in terms of
construction, maintenance and monitoring; and (4) the
preparation of cases for trial.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was a riding student of one
defendant and was injured while riding a horse owned
by the other defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants were negligent in allowing the plaintiff to
ride their horse in an unknown area with hunter-jumper
tack instead of dressage tack. During a maneuver, the
horse bucked and threw the plaintiff and then kicked the
plaintiff. The defendants argued that the plaintiff
assumed the risk of being thrown and kicked. The court
found that, before the plaintiff got on the horse, the
plaintiff was aware of the wrong tack being used and
still rode the horse. The court also found that the
plaintiff was an experienced rider, well aware of the
risks involved in riding horses. The court held that the
plaintiff had assumed the risk of the injury suffered and
dismissed the suit. Young v. Brandt, 485 S.E.2d 519
(Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
BANKRUPTCY
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor filed for Chapter
13 and served notice of the filing on the IRS. After
notice was served, the IRS served a levy on the debtor’s
bank account. The debtor informed the IRS about the
bankruptcy filing but the IRS refused to return the
levied funds. As a result of the levy, the debtor was
unable to make mortgage payments and incurred legal
fees charged by the mortgagee and legal fees to defend
against the mortgagee and to bring the current suit
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against the IRS. The court held that, under Sections 106
and 362, the sovereign immunity of the IRS was waived
and awarded recovery of the levied funds from the IRS
plus the actually legal costs incurred by the debtor as a
result of the levy. In re Milto, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,670 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997).
DISCHARGE. The debtor failed to pay taxes and
file returns for three tax years more than three years
before the filing of the petition. During the three tax
years, the debtor had sufficient funds to pay the taxes.
The debtor argued that the taxes were dischargeable
because the IRS failed to show that the debtor
committed any direct fraudulent act in regard to the
taxes owed, such as filing a false return. The court held
that the debtor’s knowing and intentional failure to file
the returns and pay the taxes when the debtor had
sufficient funds was sufficient to demonstrate willful
attempt to evade the taxes. Therefore, the taxes owed
were nondischargeable under Section 523. In re
Fegeley, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,544 (3d Cir.
1997).
The debtors, husband and wife, filed for Chapter 13
on April 9, 1993 and filed their 1992 return on April 15,
1993, showing taxes owed. The tax liability was listed
as an unsecured priority claim of the IRS. No proof of
claim was filed for the taxes and no payments were
made under the Chapter 13 plan. The debtors were
granted a discharge on April 14, 1996 after making all
plan payments. The IRS then collected the taxes by levy
against wages and an offset of a 1996 refund. The IRS
argued that the 1992 taxes were a post-petition debt
because the taxes, under Section 1305(a)(1), did not
become due and payable until the 1992 tax return was
filed. The court held that the 1992 taxes were a pre-
petition debt, even though the return was not due or
filed until after the petition was filed. The court held
that the determination of whether a claim was post- or
pre-petition was made, not under Section 1305, but
under Section 101(5). The IRS claimed that it could not
file a proof of claim until the debtor filed an income tax
return, preventing the IRS from filing an accurate proof
of claim in the case. The court noted that the IRS would
have up to 180 days after the filing of the petition to file
a proof of claim, well within sufficient time for a debtor
to be required to file a tax return. Therefore, the court
held that, even though the taxes were listed in the plan
but were not paid, the taxes were discharged because no
proof of claim was filed by the debtors or the IRS. In re
Dixon, 210 B.R. 610 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1997), aff’g
on reconsid., 209 B.R. 535 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1997).
COOPERATIVES
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL. The
defendant was an independent non-profit corporation
with five sugar producer cooperatives as equal
shareholders. The plaintiff was employed as a truck
driver  for a third party and was injured while delivering
molasses to a facility owned by the defendant. The
defendant operated solely to market the sugar products
produced by the five cooperatives. The plaintiff sought
to include the five cooperatives as defendants by
ignoring the corporate structure of the defendant such
that all six organizations constituted a single business
activity. The plaintiff first argued that the formation of
the defendant corporation served no useful additional
purpose because the five cooperatives needed to market
their products anyway. The court held that the formation
of a marketing corporation was allowed by La. Rev.
Stat. § 3.121 et seq. which provided for the formation of
marketing cooperatives. Therefore, the court held that
the formation of the defendant had a valid business
reason. However, the court held that, because the
cooperative marketing statute did not override general
corporation law, the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil would still apply to the defendant. The court found
that the corporation had followed all of the corporate
formalities of records, meetings, adequate and separate
capitalization,  and separate bank accounts. The plaintiff
did not provide any evidence that the formation of the
corporation was fraudulent or that the five cooperatives
ignored the corporate structure in dealing with the
defendant; therefore, the court held that the five
cooperatives were separate entities without liability for
the accident. Hayseed v. Louisiana Sugar Cane
Products, 692 So.2d 524 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
CRIMINAL LAW
HARASSMENT OF HUNTERS . The defendant
was convicted of harassment of hunters under Ohio Rev.
Stat. § 1533.03(A)(2).  The defendant was hired by a
rural land owner to patrol the owner’s property line to
prevent hunting on the property. A hunter had wounded
a deer which ran onto the owner’s property. When the
hunters neared the property line, the defendant shouted
and waved her hands in an attempt to prevent the deer
from leaving the owner’s property. The trial court ruled
that, because the defendant’s voice and actions could
affect hunting on the neighboring property, the
defendant was guilty of harassing the hunter. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the statute applied
only if the harassment occurred while a defendant was
on property on which hunting was allowed. Because the
defendant was legally on property which legally
prohibited hunting, the harassment statute did not apply





BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has adopted as final
regulations amending the brucellosis regulations by
changing the classification of Tennessee from Class A
to Class Free. 62 Fed. Reg. 48751 (Sept. 17, 1997).
The APHIS has adopted as final regulations
amending the brucellosis regulations by changing the
148                                                                                                                                                                 Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
classification of Kentucky from Class A to Class Free.
62 Fed. Reg. 48475 (Sept. 16, 1997).
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued
proposed regulations under the Common Crop
Insurance Policy Basic Provisions to convert the canola
and rapeseed pilot insurance program to a permanent
insurance program for the 1998 and succeeding crop
years. 62 Fed. Reg. 48956 (Sept. 18, 1997).
GROWTH RETARDANT. See summary of case
under Products Liability, infra. Didier v. Drexel
Chemical Co., 938 P.2d 364 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
HERBICIDE. See summary of case under Products
Liability, infra. Barnes v. Sandoz Crop Protection
Corp., 938 P.2d 95 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
PEANUTS. The AMS has adopted a final interim
rule which decreases the administrative assessment rate
established for the Peanut Administrative Committee
under Marketing Agreement No. 146 (agreement) for
the 1997-98 and subsequent crop years. The assessment
rate for the Committee for the 1997-98 and subsequent
crop years decreases from $0.70 to $0.35 per net ton. 62
Fed. Reg. 48749 (Sept. 17, 1997).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMOD-
ITIES ACT. The plaintiff was a produce dealer
licensed under the PACA. The plaintiff hired a person
as supervisor of a packing crew. The USDA notified the
plaintiff that the employee had been found to have been
a person responsibly connected with another company
which had committed frequent and flagrant violations of
PACA; therefore, the person could not be employed
with the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that the person
was removed from the payroll, but the evidence showed
that the person continued to work for the plaintiff and
even signed checks and a lease for the plaintiff. The
ALJ had imposed a 14 day suspension of the plaintiff’s
license for employment of the person, citing the
mitigating factors of the good financial status of the
plaintiff and the negative effect on the plaintiff’s other
employees of a long suspension. The JO, on review,
rejected the mitigating factors claimed by the plaintiff
and increased the suspension to 30 days. The court
upheld the constitutionality of the employment
prohibition provision of U.S.C. § 499a(b)(10). The court
also held that the plaintiff had no standing to challenge
the determination that the person was responsibly
connected with the company which was found to have
violated PACA. The court also upheld the JO’s
increasing of the suspension period to 30 days. Bama
Tomato Co. v. USDA, 112 F.3d 1542 (11th Cir. 1997).
TUBERCULOSIS. The APHIS has adopted as final
regulations amending the tuberculosis regulations by
changing the classification of Virginia from modified
accredited state to accredited-free state. 62 Fed. Reg.
48165 (Sept. 15, 1997).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES. The decedent’s
estate included a 150 acre residential property which
was included in a marital trust for the decedent and over
which the decedent had a general power of appointment.
If the decedent failed to appoint the property to
someone, the property passed to a residuary trust
established by the decedent’s predeceased spouse. The
decedent did not appoint the property; however, the
estate held the property until other assets were sold and
until after the federal estate tax return was filed. The
estate tax return included a deduction for the anticipated
costs of maintaining and selling the property. The court
held that the costs were not deductible because the
estate gave no sufficient reason for holding the property
so long and not transferring the property itself to the
residuary trust where the costs would have been
chargeable to the trust. On reconsideration en banc, the
court discussed it’s prior decision in Estate of Park v.
Comm’r, 475 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1973), which held that
administrative expenses were deductible only if allowed
by state law. The IRS argued that the term
administrative expenses in I.R.C. § 2053(a) was not
self-defining and that Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a)
provided the proper interpretation of deductible
administrative expenses, requiring that the expenses be
allowed by state law and be “actually and necessarily”
incurred in the administration of the decedent’s estate.
The appellate court noted that the Tax Court had not
made any determination as to whether the costs of
maintaining and selling the property were actual and
necessary for the administration of the estate. The court
also noted that the estate had made plausible arguments
for the necessity of holding the property until after filing
the estate tax return; therefore, the case was remanded
for findings and rulings on that issue. Est. of Millikin v.
Comm’r, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,287 (6th
Cir. 1997), rev’g on reconsid. en banc, 106 F.3d 1263
(6th Cir. 1997), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1995-288.
VALUATION.  Two days before the death of the
decedent and when the decedent was terminally ill, the
decedent’s children, as co-trustees of two revocable
trusts for the benefit of the decedent, transferred trust
assets to a limited partnership in exchange for a 98
percent interest in the partnership. The children
purchased the remaining 2 percent. The trustees then
transferred two 30 percent interests in the partnership to
themselves for $10,000 and promissory notes, leaving
the decedent’s trust holding a 38 percent interest in the
partnership when the decedent died. The decedent’s
estate discounted the value of the estate’s partnership
interest.  The effect of the discounting was that the trust
transferred over $2 million in estate assets to the
partnership in exchange for partnership interests which
were valued by the estate for $1 million less, all within
two days. The IRS ruled that the transfer would be
disregarded for estate tax valuation purposes because
the transfers did not change the testamentary passage of
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the assets, the co-trustees were related parties and were
essentially dealing with themselves, and the notes were
not bona fide because the children had no intention of
making any payments.  Unpub. Ltr. Rul. (CCH
Online, April 3, 1997).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBT. The taxpayer facilitated the assignment
of a partnership interest in a business to a third party.
The taxpayer issued a personal check to the purchaser of
the partnership interest in an amount equal to the
purchase price. The taxpayer claimed that the check was
a loan to the third party but did not produce any
evidence of a note or repayment terms. The taxpayer
also failed to provide evidence that the “loan” became
worthless in the tax year for which a bad deduction was
claimed. The court disallowed any bad debt deduction
for the amount paid to the third party. Paleveda v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-416.
     DISASTER AREAS-ALM § 4.05[2].* The President
has declared certain areas of Minnesota as disaster areas
from a July 28, 1997 storm. Losses from these casualties
may be deducted in taxpayers’ 1996 returns.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayers, husband and
wife, purchased an 80 acre ranch, although the
taxpayers had no farm or ranch experience. The husband
worked as an engineering consultant. The wife worked
full time on the ranch.  The taxpayers made substantial
improvements to the property, including remodeling of
the residence and farm buildings and installing an
irrigation system which made use of a reservoir located
on the property. Without the irrigation system, the
property would not support raising livestock. The
taxpayers tried several unsuccessful animal raising
activities before deciding to raise 25 cattle and 60 sheep
on the property during the tax years involved in the
case. The taxpayers filed several lawsuits to protect their
water rights in the water in the reservoir and were
generally successful in protecting those rights. The court
held that the taxpayers did not operate the ranch with
the intent to make a profit, based on examining the
factors of Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b): (1) the taxpayers
failed to expand the herds of livestock sufficient to
operate the ranch at a profit; (2) the taxpayers had little
ranch experience and, although they made attempts to
become educated about livestock raising, they did not
consult experts; (3) only the wife spent significant time
on the ranch operations; (4) the taxpayers failed to take
steps to make the ranch profitable within a reasonable
time, although the long range plan was to provide a
profitable business to allow the husband to retire from
the consulting business; (5) most of the expenses were
attributable to the ranch operation and not maintenance
of the land; therefore, the appreciation of the land could
not be included in the profit expectations of the
investment; (6) the ranch never generated a profit; (7)
the taxpayers had other income which was offset by the
ranch losses; and (8) the taxpayers received substantial
personal recreational enjoyment from the property.
Butler v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-408.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, were employed
full time with General Motors and had both grown up
working with horses on their family ranches. The
taxpayers started a Tennessee Walking Horse breeding
business on rural property which the taxpayers
developed for the horse raising and training activity.
The business was started without a specific plan but the
taxpayer did talk with experts on the feasibility of such
an operation. The taxpayers relocated the business when
the taxpayers were transferred by their employer to
another state. The taxpayers purchased, bred and sold
several horses over the six tax years involved but did
not show a taxable profit in any of the years. During the
early years of operation, the taxpayers maintained a box
of receipts as the only separate recordkeeping for the
horse breeding activity, but they eventually kept
separate ledgers for the activity. The court held that the
taxpayers were allowed the deduction of business
expenses in excess of income from the horse breeding
activity based on the following factors: (1) the business
was carried on in a business like manner with separate
recordkeeping, use of advertising and discontinuance of
non-profit activities; (2) the taxpayers had extensive
personal experience with raising and training horses; (3)
the taxpayers expended considerable effort on the
activity; (4) the taxpayers realized profit from the sale of
the first property, indicating that their improvement
efforts resulted in appreciation of business assets; (5)
many of the losses were caused by crop losses and
market influences independent of the taxpayers’ efforts;
(6) although the business had no taxable profit, the
business did realize a net profit in two years and
substantial profit if the gain from the sale of the first
property was included; (7) the taxpayers did not have
substantial income from other sources; and (8) the
taxpayers did not use the horses for personal pleasure.
Also at issue was whether the holding of the land could
be included in the horse breeding activity sufficient to
include the land appreciation in determining whether the
business was entered into with the intent to make a
profit. The court held that the holding of the land was
part of the horse breeding activity because (1) the land
was purchased solely for its suitability for raising
horses, (2) the land was improved only with buildings
and crop tilling which were necessary for the horse
breeding activity and the taxpayers lived on and
operated the business solely on the land. Hofer v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-417.
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that
for the period October 1, 1997 through December 30,
1997, the interest rate paid on tax overpayments is 8
percent and for underpayments is 9 percent. The interest
rate for underpayments by large corporations is 11
percent. Rev. Rul. 97-40, I.R.B. 1997-__.
I R A . In 1994, the taxpayer requested a full
distribution from a pension plan, paid by check directly
to the taxpayer. The pension plan sent a check to the
taxpayer but withheld 20 percent for federal taxes. The
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taxpayer was notified about this withholding in January
1995 by issuance of Form 1099-R from the pension
plan. The taxpayer deposited the distribution check in an
IRA.  The taxpayer was younger than 59 1/2 years old at
the time of the distribution and withholding. The court
noted that, had the taxpayer requested distribution of the
pension funds directly to the IRA, no withholding would
have been required. The court also noted that, had the
taxpayer contributed to the IRA an amount equal to the
withheld funds, the withheld funds would not have
taxable, nor would the withheld funds have been subject
to the early withdrawal penalty.  The taxpayer argued
that the intent during the whole process was to
effectuate a complete rollover to the IRA which was
prevented only by the withholding. The court held that
the statute was clear as to the withholding requirements
which were avoidable by the taxpayer by the two
methods noted by the court discussed above. Moon v.
Comm’r, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,668 (Fed.
Cls. 1997).
MEDICAID AVOIDANCE TRUSTS. The 1997
Tax Act amended the criminal liability for assisting
persons in disposing of assets in order to qualify for
medical assistance to include person who “for a fee
knowingly and willfully counsels or assists an
individual to dispose of assets (including by any transfer
in trust) in order for the individual to become eligible
for medical assistance under a State plan under title
XIX, if disposing of the assets results in the imposition
of a period of ineligibility for such assistance under
section 1917(c) . . .” 1997 Act, Sec. 4734.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. Two limited
partnerships were formed with the same partners and
held real estate for development. As part of an attempt
to streamline the management of the properties, the two
partnerships were merged into a new limited liability
company, with all members’ shares equal to their
interests in the partnerships. The mortgages on the
properties were refinanced into one loan. Because one
partnership owed more on its loans, the members’ share
of liability were equalized with distributions. The IRS
ruled that the conversion would not cause recognition of
loss or gain, would not affect the holding period of the
assets, would not affect the partnership’s basis in its
assets or partners’ basis in the partnership, and would
give the LLC the Employer Identification Number of
the partnership with the most assets. Ltr. Rul. 9738013,
June 18, 1997.
PENSION PLANS . For plans beginning in
September 1997, the weighted average is 6.84 percent
with the permissible range of 6.15 to 7.31 percent (90 to
109 percent permissable range) and 6.15 to 7.52 percent
(90 to 110 percent permissable range) for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 97-51, I.R.B. 1997-__, _.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. During 1993,
1994, and 1995 the taxpayer was an S corporation. In
each of these years a limited partnership of which the
taxpayer owned an interest had discharge of
indebtedness income. The taxpayer relied on a certified
public accountant to prepare its Form 1120S for each
year, but the accountant failed to make the election to
treat the taxpayer’s share of the discharge of
indebtedness as qualified real property business
indebtedness, under I.R.C. § 108(c)(3). The error was
discovered in 1996 by an attorney hired to review the
taxpayer’s financial and tax situation. The attorney
promptly filed for an extension of time to file the
election. The taxpayer and accountant represented that
the failure to file the election was not motivated by any
tax planning or tax avoidance intent. The IRS ruled that
the extension would be granted since no tax effect
would result from the delay in making the election. Ltr.
Rul. 9738033, June 2, 1997.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer was
formerly married and as part of the divorce in 1989, sold
the marital residence. The taxpayer elected to defer the
taxpayer’s share of the gain on the sale under I.R.C. §
1034 (repealed in 1997). In 1991, the taxpayer
remarried and the couple purchased a home. The
taxpayer and new spouse claimed the entire purchase
price of the new residence in calculating whether the
taxpayer was eligible to rollover the gain from the sale
of the previous residence. The IRS argued that, under
Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(f), the taxpayer was not eligible
to claim the entire purchase price because the taxpayer
did not reside in both residences with the same spouse.
The IRS allowed only half of the purchase price, an
amount less than the taxpayer’s share of deferred gain
from the first house. The court held that Treas. Reg. §
1.1034-1(f) was invalid insofar as it prevented remarried
taxpayers from deferring gain when purchasing a second
residence with a new spouse. Snowa v. Comm’r, 97-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,614 (4th Cir. 1997).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
October 1997
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.84 5.76 5.72 5.69
110% AFR 6.44 6.34 6.29 6.26
120% AFR 7.03 6.91 6.85 6.81
Mid-term
AFR 6.34 6.24 6.19 6.16
110% AFR 6.98 6.86 6.80 6.76
120% AFR 7.63 7.49 7.42 7.38
Long-term
AFR 6.68 6.57 6.52 6.48
110% AFR 7.36 7.23 7.17 7.12
120% AFR 8.04 7.88 7.80 7.75
LABOR
AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION. The defendant
operated a greenhouse which employed the plaintiffs as
laborers. The plaintiffs filed suit for violations of the
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FLSA for failure of the defendant to pay time and a half
wages for overtime work. The greenhouse operation
included the growing of plants from seed, cuttings,
bulbs and seedlings and the receiving, care and shipping
of plants grown by third parties. The plaintiffs were also
required to carry, use and sell packaged planting soil,
fertilizers and other “hard goods” which were sold, used
and mixed by the greenhouse. Finally, the plaintiffs
were occasionally required to perform yard work and
other menial tasks at the residence of the owner of the
greenhouse. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs
were all agricultural laborers exempt from the FLSA
because their work involved agricultural products. The
defendant also argued that the work for the owner was
minimal in respect to the other work and should not
affect the plaintiffs’ status. The court held that the de
minimis rule applied only within the general context of
the labor performed within each category of work.
Because the work for the owner was not part of the
owner’s agricultural operations, none of the labor for the
owner could be exempt from the FLSA as agricultural
labor. The court held that the work performed in the
greenhouse on plants grown by the defendant or shipped
in from other growers was agricultural labor. The court
did apply the de minimis rule to the work involving the
“hard goods” because the percentage of sales involving
the hard goods was insignificant to the total plant sales
and the hard goods were integral to the care and
production of the plants. Adkins v. Mid-America
Growers, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
GROWTH RETARDANT. The plaintiffs were
potato farmers who applied a growth retardant to their
potatoes, resulting in the loss of the potatoes. The
plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of the retardant under
breach of warranty, negligence, and violation of the
Washington Uniform Commercial Code and the
Consumer’s Protection Act. The plaintiffs claimed that
the manufacturer knew that the retardant should not be
applied to a crop if the temperature exceeded 85 degrees
on the day of application, but the manufacturer failed to
notify the plaintiffs about this restriction. The found that
all of the plaintiffs’ claims were based on the
defendant’s failure to provide this information;
therefore, the court held that all the claims were based
on labeling requirements in addition to those required
by FIFRA. Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs’
claims were pre-empted by FIFRA. Didier v. Drexel
Chemical Co., 938 P.2d 364 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
HERBICIDE. The plaintiff was a cotton farmer and
sued the defendant manufacturer of a herbicide for
alleged damages to the plaintiff’s cotton crop. The
plaintiff brought actions in breach of warranty, strict
products liability and negligence. The defendant argued
that the negligence and breach of warranty claims were
pre-empted by FIFRA and that the strict liability claim
failed for lack of evidence. The trial court had dismissed
all claims because of pre-emption by FIFRA. The
appellate court upheld the summary judgment on the
strict liability action because the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that the herbicide was defective for all
cotton crops. The plaintiff’s experts testified only that
the herbicide should not have been used on the
plaintiff’s crop because of the specific environmental
conditions of the land. The experts acknowledged that
the herbicide was effective for cotton crops on
neighboring land because the owners compensated for
the special condition of their land in formulating the
amount of herbicide to use. The remaining claims were
based on alleged design defects and the failure of the
defendant to advise the plaintiff that the land conditions
required different doses of the herbicide. The court held
that these claims were pre-empted by FIFRA because
the claims relied on the defendant providing information
other than that required for the label by FIFRA. Barnes
v. Sandoz Crop Protection Corp., 938 P.2d 95 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1997).
ZONING
AGRICULTURAL USE. The plaintiffs were
owners of residences neighboring a 72 acre farm located
within a district zoned as residential. The farm land had
been farmed for over 200 years and 32 acres were
currently leased to a farmer who wanted to construct a
retail farmstand on the edge of the property abutting a
residential street. The land on which the stand would be
located contained an underground aquifer. Under local
zoning law, a special permit was required to build a
structure or other improvement on land containing an
aquifer. The plaintiffs argued that the stand was not an
allowed structure because it was not an agricultural
pursuit, since the stand would be making retail sales.
The court held that the sale of produce grown on the
land was sufficiently connected to farming to be
allowed on land zoned for agricultural pursuits. The
court acknowledged that agricultural uses could not
generally be prohibited by zoning laws, but that
reasonable and necessary restrictions could be placed on
new agricultural uses. In this case, the special permit
required only the reporting of chemicals to be used, sold
and stored on the premises. The court held that such
requirements were reasonable and necessary to protect
the aquifer and were a valid zoning restriction on the
produce stand construction. Prime v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals of Norwell, 680 N.E.2d 118 (Mass. Ct. App.
1997).
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2d ANNUAL SEMINAR IN PARADISE
  
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING by Dr. Neil E. Harl
January 5-9, 1998
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1998! Balmy
trade winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand
beaches and the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a
world-class seminar on Farm Estate and Business
Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl.  The seminar is scheduled
for January 5-9, 1998 at the spectacular ocean-front
Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort on the Big Island,
Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.
each day, Monday through Friday, with a continental
breakfast and break refreshments included in the
registration fee.  Each participant will receive a copy of
Dr. Harl's 400 page seminar manual, Farm Estate and
Business Planning: Annotated Materials which will be
updated just prior to the seminar.
     Here are the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year
installment payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts,
taxation and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, family-owned business exclusion,
handling life insurance, marital deduction planning,
disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of
both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with
future interests, handling estate freezes, and "hidden"
gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including
income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part
gift/part sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living
trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two,
corporations, general and limited partnerships and
limited liability companies.
   •  Ethics (2 hours).
The Agricultural Law Press has made arrangements
for group discount air fares on United Airlines,
available through Sun Quest Vacations. In addition,
attendees are eligible for substantial discounts on hotel
rooms at the Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort, the site
of the seminar. Early registration is important to obtain
the lowest airfares and insure availability of convenient
flights at a busy travel time of the year.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current
subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest or the
Agricultural Law Manual. The registration fee for
nonsubscribers is $695.
If you have not yet received a registration packet
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